Someone should rewrite Gallipoli as an example of 19th century meets 20th.
The Cold War skirmish on the Malay Peninsula just after WWII has been said to have been a “post-colonial, nationalist struggle,” but there is evidence that it was somewhat more, and less, than that. It was one of the first long-term modestly successful counterinsurgencies by Britain since the Act of Union in 1804, and used successful techniques known as “hearts and minds” to win popular support away from the insurgents. However, there were several motives behind the conflict in the first place that went beyond the many post-1945 Third World struggles of at nation building: it was an extension of the generations-long Chinese civil conflict that ended a most important phase in 1949. The Chinese communist-led Malay uprising pitted the Maoists and other crypto-Marxists against all those who would get in their way.
All insurgencies start from some grievance somewhere, so it is instructive to look at the situation in Malaya before the “emergency” was declared. Before 1941 the ground was ripe for rebellion, and some stirrings of rebellion. European contact with the peninsula began with the first Portuguese contact in 1511. By the end of the 18th Century the British East India Company gained control as a counterweight against the growing Dutch presence in the East Indies, and to prevent revolutionary France from exploiting the feuding sultanates that controlled the strategically vital Straits of Malacca. The British found their new sources of latex and tin ores to be lucrative, and settled in for a stay by 1867.
The Malays apparently had little control over their own destiny. While the colonial administration and the plantation and mine workers enjoyed a very high standard of living, most of the native workers were edging poverty. By 1895 the last sultan of a major Malay state was no more than a figurehead, and the largest and most populous states accepted confederation status with Britain. And just in time, because the British situation in the area was becoming desperate. The lavish and powerful naval base at Singapore, built as an anchor against the growing German presence in the East Indies before WWI, was immune to seaward invasion but vulnerable to landward attack. Worse, the British Army garrison troops were forbidden to train in the jungle-covered peninsula because it was so disease and hazard-infested for European troops.
By the end of the 1914-18 war European influence was restricted to Britain and the Netherlands, but China was beginning to affect events in the region. Seeking external sources of support, both KMT and communist agents had infiltrated the large Chinese refugee population working in Malaya and Singapore. The Malayan Communist Party (MCP) was founded in 1920 by Maoists of the Nan Yang, also known as the South Seas Communist Party, a fairly obscure study-group-style movement with little power, and little heard of until the 1930s. Both the KMT government and the Chinese communists encouraged various anti-colonial movements in the East Indies and Indochina, even while they were at each other’s throats.
When war with Germany began in 1939 the flow of German arms to China (the KMT government was Germany’s biggest overseas customer) came to an end, and with it the trickle of support to the Malay nationalist movements. The two Chinese factions joined forces when Japan invaded China, but their influence was beginning to wane as Japanese agents fomented the ideals of the Greater East Asia Co-Prosperity Sphere in 1940, and soon the Chinese were again at odds with each other in Malaya.
The Japanese invasion of Malaya in 1941 triggered open civil war between the factions, but the communists were getting help. The MCP formed a front group called the Anti-Enemy Backing-Up Society (AEBUS) that received arms and training from the British Special Operations Executive (SOE) and the American Office of Strategic Services (OSS). In 1942 the MCP also formed the Malayan People’s Anti-Japanese Union and Forces (MPAJUF) that, with the AEBUS, fought the Japanese at the far end of a very long logistical tether. With practically no supplies coming in the disparate groups did considerable damage to Japanese efforts, but Japan had no trouble recruiting sizable security forces from among the Malays.
In August 1942 the MCP leadership was arrested by Japanese authorities and large numbers executed, but Leninist party Secretary Lai Peck and his Stalinist assistant Chen Ping survived. While the nationalist insurgency continued in a dispersed fashion, the communist effort was centrally and tightly controlled, not risking cadres in combat but exposing them occasionally to safer raids. The MCP guerrillas also spent a great deal of resources in killing informers and reeducating recalcitrants who deviated from the party line. When Japan surrendered and the SOE supplies ended, the MCP had some 7,000 highly trained and disciplined cadres. Soon after the British returned to Malaya Lai Peck disappeared with the MCP treasury, and Chen Ping was left in the vacuum.
Taking advantage of the administrative confusion after the war, the MCP organized labor strikes and guerrilla raids to coordinate with the 100th anniversary of the 1848 revolutions that so inspired Marx and Engels. They also introduced an organization called Min Yuen; a peacetime version of the Anti-Japanese Union, as a political front to coordinate a shadow government. The British reaction to the violence began with a conventional military response of large units in sweeps through unfamiliar territory that had practically no effect other than to embolden the guerrillas. After ineffectively bungling up through 1950, the Korean conflict brought new prosperity to Malaya, and new attention to the insurgency as a communist Chinese effort to destabilize Asia. While Chen Ping apparently wanted to liberate Malaya, there’s no evidence that Mao had a mind for a presence in the Straits of Malacca.
But no matter, because a distinct change in strategy was yielding results by late 1951. While population control measures such as food rationing and strict curfews were imposed on the villages that supplied the guerrillas, the army turned to more auxiliaries, intelligence-gathering, police and small-unit operations that began to yield results by the end of 1951. By 1953 MCP recruiting was less than half what it had been in 1950, and guerrilla casualties to starvation began to outnumber those to combat. Local elections were held in 1955, when the combat phase of the British operation was at an end; a national government was in place by 1957; the consolidation of government control was complete by 1960.
Chen Ping, however, wasn’t done. He and a few hundred of his followers retreated to the Malay-Thai border and operated an insurgency from there at least until the mid 1970s, concentrating his efforts on the 40% of Malaya’s ethnic Chinese population. He was never captured, and the MCP still raids into Johore, mostly attacking the economic infrastructure of Malaysia.
While ultimately successful in keeping a communist-dominated group from controlling the Straits of Malacca, the British counterinsurgency was a mechanistic one that failed to address the root of the problem: discord among the ethnic Chinese and the refugees from the Chinese mainland that was about 40% of Malaya’s population, and that still boils over today. While the MCP is a legal organization in modern Malaysia, its renegade counterpart is pirate band in the Straights, responsible for billions in shipping losses and a twenty-fold increase in insurance rates in forty years. It boasts of control of large parts of the most rugged country close to Thailand, but exercises it only occasionally. While the decentralized counterinsurgency approach the British used to stabilize the country were effective, the problem of the large ethnic Chinese population remains.. Modern Malaysia may have to deal with a wider problem again soon.
Asprey, Robert, War in the Shadows: The Guerrilla in History, Volumes 1 and 2. New York: Doubleday and Company, 1975.
Black, Jeremy, War Since 1945. New York: Reaktion Books, 2006
Carver, Michael, War Since 1945. New York: Prometheus Books, 1990
Kensington, Roger LTC (Ret) Special Air Service, British Army (Maintenance supervisor, MinePro Services Malaysia (a division of P&H Mining Equipment), personal interview with the author, July 2010.
Marston, Daniel, and Carter Malcasian (eds), Counterinsurgency in Modern Warfare. Oxford: Osprey Publishing, 2008.
Pye, Lucian W., Guerrilla Communism and Malaya–Its Social and Political Meaning. Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1956.
While I struggle through my latest healh crisis, indulge me…
If ever there were an example of failure snatched out of the jaws of success,the struggle over the future of Rhodesia would be the model to emulate. The British government managed, by simply refusing to look for corruption and intimidation, to destroy the sacrifice of a generation of white Africans in favor of the appeasement of the oil sheikdoms of the Persian Gulf.
Rhodesia was always an odd duck. Though self-governing as a state after 1965 she was not sovereign, and those of European extraction who lived there were not considered “African” by the natives: even Daniel Marston in Counterinsurgency in Modern Warfare refers to non-black Rhodesians as some undefinable “others,” while the insurgents were deemed “Africans” because of their skin color. This is akin to claiming that the whites of 1888 living in the Australian colonies were not really Australians, but Europeans who just were born and spent their entire lives on the other side of the world.
The Chimurenga in Rhodesia–depending on dialect translates into either “insurrection,” “armed struggle” or “revolution”–began when the black nationalists refused to participate in a gradual transfer of power from the predominantly white government in 1962. Joshua Nkomo’s ZAPU was the first of several organizations that began a long campaign of violence, intimidation and propaganda. Backed by the Soviets, the campaign was fought not just against the white-dominated government, but also against other, rival black nationalist organizations.
The Rhodesian government declared independence from Britain in 1965, but this was recognized by few. Britain had its hands full elsewhere a the time, and had let Rhodesia govern itself for some time, and for this reason the declaration had little real function. The Rhodesian army was small, the air force not much larger, but the police and auxiliaries were sizable. Led by an effective cooperation that bordered on the breathtaking, the Rhodesian government successfully campaigned for nearly two decades, adapting their technological and organizational prowess to hold back the growing number of sophisticated organizations set on dislodging the government.
But the Rhodesian whites always knew that this was a war they were not going to win. There were too few active supporters of the white government and too many passive supporters of the rebels. Sophistication vs. numbers was ultimately a losing game. Through the 1950s, ‘60s and ‘70s while the Americans were preoccupied by Vietnam and its aftermath and Britain was absorbed with Malaya, Aden and economic challenges at home, the Soviets and Chinese made inroads into the African National Congress (ANC) and all its offshoots. South Africa and Mozambique were allies with the Rhodesian government but had their own problems with violent groups vying for power.
Ultimately Rhodesia was the victim of simple mathematics. By 1979 blacks held a legal franchise, and in 1979 duly elected a black African to power, but it was the wrong black African. Britain, under pressure by the Arab states that controlled the supply of petroleum, denounced the election results and demanded another. The next election was only locally monitored, and the “right” candidate won. The insurgents took charge and promptly destroyed the country by essentially disenfranchising white landowners, who fled in droves or waited to be murdered.
Writing is easy: Just sit at a keyboard and open a vein.
Thoughtful alternative to the “folly” of naval operations in the Bosporus.
The critical element of the Arab-Israeli conflict since 1948 is that it is the shape of the world before the invention of peace in the 18th Century. Conflict is endemic to animal life, and the artificial construct that declares that lions can lay with lambs creates a false sense that the pleasant imagery is achievable.
There are political and economic arguments for continuing conflict that are easily inflamed into religious rhetoric. Islam, an evangelical Abrahamic ideology, insists that the land belongs to those of their faith, though the faith itself is two millennia younger than Judaism, a non-evangelical Abrahamic ideology that was thriving in the area about three thousand years before the founding of the city of Mecca. Economically, Israel is capable of producing five times the luxury goods per capita of all their neighbors combined, engendering accusations of economic destitution among their neighbors that are caused by unfair trading practices, anti-non-Jew discrimination and uneven “opportunities” for Jews over those of any other faith. Since the partition of Israel many states, individuals and organizations has treated the conflict there as litmus tests for democracy, anti-Semitism, and support of the United States. Those that support Israel are thought to be supporters of the US and its institutions; those who do not, in the popular imagination, don’t.
Conflicts in the Middle East are cycles of low-level asymmetrical, socio-economic and diplomatic warfare, occasionally breaking into outright fighting on a small scale between the military and security forces of Israel and dozens of other states and various “liberation” guerrilla groups. Irregularly, large and spectacular attacks are staged, including
- The El Al hijacking in 1968;
- Munich and the campaign of violence afterwards that hunted down the planners in 1972;
- Lodz airport in 1974;
- The Air France hijacking in 1976;
- The Osirak reactor bombing in 1981.
These noteworthy attacks are interspersed with repeated waves of intifadas and other general disruptions, civil wars, bombings, and riots. Internationally, boycotts, and propaganda maneuvers are punctuated by “conferences” that are little more than photo opportunities, with “frameworks” designed by diplomats to describe a “peace process” that has not yielded more than a few months of relative calm in the region in nearly sixty years of trying.
Israel had been the subject of more UN sanction motions for alleged human rights abuses than all other member states combined. States on the UN’s Human Rights Subcommittee when many of these sanctions were voted on have included Cambodia, Cuba and Libya. Zionism, a loose term for Jewish self-determination, has been equated with ethnic cleansing, genocide and racism by states including the former Soviet Union, China and Haiti.
Four times since 1948 the conflict has broken out into conventional warfare: 1956, 1967, 1973 and 1981. The proxy nature of the conflict is readily apparent:
- The 1956 conflict coincided with Egyptian attempts to nationalize the Suez Canal after a coup that deposed Egypt’s king and Egypt’s subsequent recognition of the People’s Republic of China over Western objections;
- The 1967 conflict was in part occasioned by the Soviet Union recognizing the United Arab Republic, Gamal Nasser’s attempt at a pan-Arab Egypt/Syria/Jordan union (curiously, “Arab” here excluded Saudi Arabia);
- The low-mid-level “war of attrition” from 1969 to 1970, when artillery barrages, commando raids and air attacks were conducted every day;
- The 1981 Israeli invasion of Lebanon coincided with increasing tensions between the Soviet bloc and the West occasioned by the takeover of the American embassy in Tehran in 1978.
There seems to be no real resolution to the conflict, and there seems to be little desire for either “side” to live and coexist together in anything approaching stable harmony. As long as ideologues can drive their followers to deeds of barbarity, there shall be a conflict in the eastern Mediterranean.
It was the first Sunday morning in April–6 April, 1862, and had been raining for days in south central Tennessee. The boys from Illinois and Ohio, Wisconsin and Minnesota, Indiana and Iowa were just waking up. Down the Tennessee River, to the north of the 35,000 man Army of West Tennessee’s encampment, Ulysses S. Grant was at breakfast in his headquarters steamboat Tigress.near William Cherry’s mansion.. The northern boys were in those pine barrens split by creeks and streams because Corinth, Mississippi was important. The junction of four rail lines was just a day’s ride to the southwest, and this flatboat near Pitts Tucker’s long forgotten saloon–called Pittsburg Landing by then, was the best boat landing closest to the only road to Corinth that was thought (wrongly, as it turned out) to be complete with adequate space for an army.
For six days before that Sunday a 40,000 man Confederate Army of Mississippi under Albert Sidney Johnson had marched through the mud and water to position itself to the south and west of Grant’s. William T. Sherman, who was encamped at a Methodist meeting house called Shiloh Church, “knew” that Johnston was cowering at Corinth, waiting for Grant’s army to come and crush them.
It was not quite five in the morning when it started. A bunch of Mississippi boys from William H Hardee’s corps ran into a bunch of Missouri and Michigan boys from Benjamin J. Prentiss’s division in the dark. The Unionists were outnumbered and fell back to their camps, where they found the rest of the division, likely all of two thousand or so, just getting out of their tents and falling in on the company streets. Few had ever seen combat before. Many never would again, but the first thunderous blast from Prentiss’ two brigades into Hardee’s men at about a hundred yards was probably what Grant and his staff heard nine river miles away that made them end their breakfast and cast off for Pittsburg Landing. The time was about 7:00 AM.
Prentiss’ men held on for probably 45 minutes. His command gradually disintegrated as Hardee’s and then Braxton Bragg’s corps edged closer and closer. His two batteries finally pulled out and the last of Prentiss’ stalwarts broke for the rear.
The other Federals shook themselves out of their tents as the noise grew: the “bayoneted in their tents” meme of Shiloh has always been a myth. Sherman finally came to understand what all the fuss was about for the past three days that he had been getting reports of Confederate movement when his aide was decapitated next to him that morning. “My God,” he is said to have muttered, “we are attacked.” After that bit of understatement, he lost two horses and was wounded five times that day. John A. McClernand, another Federal division commander, sent a brigade south to join Sherman’s open flank to Prentiss’ while Stephen A. Hurlbut and WHL Wallace shook out their divisions and marched to the sound of guns.
The Confederates drove into every successive Federal line like a rising tide, but it was 10: in the morning before Sherman and McClernand’s forces were overwhelmed. By then Prentiss’s survivors had combined with Wallace’s and Hurlbut’s arriving men to form around a small pond, several stands of woods, a sunken road and a peach orchard, where they stood for the next seven hours against more than a dozen brigade-sized attacks. Grant had told Prentiss to hold onto his position “at all hazards” because the road around it was the direct route to Pittsburg Landing.
Despite their early success, Johnston’s army was hardly a well-oiled machine. The officers had hardly any experience with commanding men on drill fields, let alone a battle field: most brigades had yet to create a morning report. Regiments and even whole brigades were often found simply standing around in the Confederate rear. Much of the army’s ammunition was stuck in a titanic traffic jam on the Corinth road; the army’s medical director was down with pneumonia. There was little coordination between the disparate forces slamming the Federals.
By 2:00 that afternoon Prentiss’ survivors, about a third of Grant’s artillery, and Hurlbut’s and Wallace’s divisions were holding off attack after attack in a position on the Federal left that came to be called the Hornet’s Nest when Johnston caught a hot piece of metal behind his knee that killed him in half an hour. By that time the fight around the pond and the peach orchard had devolved into a maelstrom of screaming metal and choking smoke, dying men and frustration.
On the Federal right, with a yawning gap that might have accommodated a Confederate division, Sherman and McClernand built line after line of men and guns they could get to stand for a few minutes: at least nine lines in ten hours. All along the fighting line on both sides the fight was a desperate race against time and exhaustion, hunger and dehydration. Water sources near the fighting line, despite the recent rains, were quickly exhausted or polluted by the dead and dying. Gunners urinated into buckets so the guns could be swabbed; infantrymen discarded muskets after they became too fouled to load.
Behind the Confederate lines Daniel Ruggels organized the elements of a grand battery that would pin down the Federal guns in the Hornet’s Nest so that an infantry attack could finally push the Federals back against the Tennessee River. On the eastern shore of the river, separated by the swollen torrent, Don C. Buell’s Army of the Ohio was scrambling to get across, but was badly placed to load on the steamboats, having only partly arrived just the day before after a fifteen day route march. Footsore and short on food, William A. Nelson’s division gathered steamboats for the half-mile crossing of the river. Miles away to the north, Lew Wallace’s Federal division marched to the sound of the guns, but was delayed by confused interpretations of Grant’s orders and arguments as to routes.
By 4:30 Ruggels’ grand battery was forcing the Federal guns to pull out of the Hornet’s Nest. The few Federal infantrymen still on their feet clung to what cover they could find. At the Landing behind them, men and animals strained to unload the steamboats loaded with heavy artillery, ammunition and the odd infantry regiment. Refugees from the battle started to arrive at the Landing and the bluffs above it soon after the battle commenced. By nightfall thousands of frightened men, women and children huddled under the bluffs waiting for the fighting to end. The roads and trails were jammed with traffic going both ways all day.
By 5:00 the Hornet’s Nest collapsed as parts of five Confederate brigades pushed into the woods, capturing guns and Prentiss, a dying WHL Wallace, men and a geographic feature that they didn’t need. The only reason that Johnston, then his successor Pierre G.T. Beauregard had been mesmerized by the place was because the Federals were there: sidestepping it would have been easy. But the Confederates couldn’t see that at this stage of the war, their tactical reconnaissance at that time was nearly non-existent and their staff work was abysmal. But behind the Hornet’s Nest there had been building a Federal grand battery, called alternately Webster’s Battery (after Grant’s chief of staff John Webster) or Grant’s Last Line. By 5:30 a brigade of Nelson’s division had got across and positioned themselves near the Landing, anchoring Grant’s line on the river. At the other end of the line, Sherman and McClernand shoved what men and guns in they could grab into a semblance of a fighting line. In between were more survivors and a half a dozen gun batteries that had yet to fire a shot As two Confederate brigades–one without ammunition–inched closer to Grant’s line at about 6:00, the line erupted in a storm of fire and metal that was heard at Savanna nine miles away. The shock wave blew off men’s hats and broke a mule’s back. The Confederate attack ground to a halt; the sun went down at about 6:15; Beauregard stopped offensive attacks at 6:30; Lew Wallace’s division arrived near the Landing at about 7:00.
Through the night Buell’s men and guns were hustled across, but it was a logistic nightmare. Landing stages were too small; the guns and horses had to be manhandled and hoisted; crowds of refugees partly blocked the Landing; the rain started again at about 10:00; steamboat skippers, few of whom knew the treacherous Tennessee well, were reluctant to break the sabbath to brave the rain-swollen river in the dark with so much traffic on it. But by daybreak about 12,000 of Buell’s 32,000 men were across, and another gun battery. Grant still outnumbered him, with about 25,000 men and fifty-odd guns on the line. But few of the Federal guns had horses for limbers, let alone caissons or ammunition wagons. Buell had brought few reloads, using most of his cargo space to bring riflemen across.
During the long night the Confederates did little to consolidate their position, feed their men or even resupply them with ammunition. There were some 20,000 casualties on this field, a charnel house of some eight square miles. Through the night two Federal gunboats shelled the Confederate line, some say without effect While the physical damage was certainly small, the morale effect was great. Every shot fired reminded the Confederates that as long as the Union gunboats were on the river, they would not be able to cross. The nearest bridge was forty miles away, up the river.
In the morning Grant and Buell attacked the Confederates and pushed them off the battlefield. Until mid-afternoon on 7 April Beauregard expected Earl Van Dorn’s 18,000 men from across the Mississippi to march up the road from Corinth. Little did he know that Van Dorn’s army had saluted the Confederate “victory” at Shiloh while waiting for steamboats on the White River some four hundred miles to the west that same morning.
In his retreat Beauregard left behind thousands of his wounded, which were just a fraction of some 23,000 casualties, including about 3,000 dead, in two days of fighting. The numbers shocked both North and South, and staggered financial markets worldwide. In two days more Americans had been killed and injured from 19 April 1775 to 5 April 1862. But war wasn’t supposed to be like this. Up until Shiloh war for Americans was a lark; an adventure of men and animals, colorful uniforms and precision marching, dancing flags and cheering crowds. Battles were supposed to end in parades, not abattoirs.
Exactly fifty-five years later, America was at war with Germany. Woodrow Wilson had asked Congress for a war declaration on 2 April 1917. Congress voted on it on 4 April, and it went into effect on 6 April. It had come after hundreds of Americans died in passenger ships that the Germans torpedoed without warning, after a veiled threat of a German alliance with Mexico and Japan, after America had offered to mediate a just peace in Europe over and over again since 1914.
For Wilson it was a personal disappointment, but the decision for war he felt became inevitable because of Prussian intransigence. Long striving for progressive principles, Wilson, whose father was with the Confederate army briefly, earnestly believed that men and nations should work out their differences peacefully, with solemn treaties openly arrived at. That such beliefs should end in places called Tannenberg and Verdun and Argonne was to Wilson and his fellow progressives an aberration of human progress.
Humanity wasn’t supposed to be this way. But it was.
They had come a long way, these young men. many of whom were still young. In the fifth April of the war they felt both tired and energized: weary of a long winter of raids and bombardments, sharpshooters and endless mud, but energized because spring was coming, and the armies around Richmond were moving again.
In February Wilmington, North Carolina, the Confederacy’s last deep-water port with rail links, had been occupied by Union troops. At Five Forks on 1 April 1865, a part of Army of Northern Virginia under George Pickett was trying to protect the Southside Railroad junction from the concerted attacks of Philip Sheridan. Overwhelmed and badly placed, the Confederates were forced to run. Using the Richmond and Danville line, Jefferson Davis and his government ran south while Robert E. Lee took the Army of Northern Virginia south and west, under close attack from the Army of the Potomac under George G. Meade.
With Meade behind him, William T. Sherman’s army group was somewhere to his south where Joseph P Johnston was trying to get away from Sherman and join Lee, and Federal cavalrymen were closing off the major roads. After nine days of moving and fighting, and after his last ration train was captured, Lee saw little choice but to give up the fight.
So the patrician Lee and the plebeian Ulysses S. Grant, who commanded all the Union armies, met on 9 April 1865 to work something out. They sat in the parlor of Wilmer McLean, a sugar broker whose house at Manassas Junction was the center of the first major battle of the war. Now, at Appomattox Court house, it would see the end of the largest theater of what had become a global war. Photographs of the time show Lee resplendent in an immaculate, new, custom-made uniform, and Grant in a mud-spattered private’s coat with lieutenant general’s shoulder straps. There was a little small talk: Grant recalled their only other meeting in Mexico, which Lee could not remember.
The talked about horses, weapons, rations, terms. Grant wanted the return of what property the Federal government owned before the war, but realized that it would be impossible to separate it from the rest, so did not press the issue much. Lee said his officers owned their animals and their sidearms, and Grant decided he would not confiscate them. Much as he had at Vicksburg, Grant knew this 28,000 man Confederate army was spent, and with nearly a hundred thousand men in arms under his command in the area, could afford to be generous. After Ely Parker wrote out the final terms, Lee signed the surrender.
Then the real battle commenced, and continues to this day. The “battle of the books” has been the most consistently acrimonious and contentious action of the American Civil War, and this scholar contends that while it is far from over it needs to end sooner than later.
There are two major battlefields of this fight: the cause and The Cause. The first centers around the reasons for the fighting to begin with, where tariffs, slavery, secession, state’s rights, firing on the flag, and other issues are the most often discussed. The second is by far the noisiest. It has more to do with the end of the war and how the entire conflict has been perceived, remembered and recorded. To many scholars this is embodied in Lost Cause Mythology, or LCM, a position that holds that the Confederacy was always going to be the loser, but was the nobler of the two factions fighting the war–hence the Lost Cause. For others, LCM is part and parcel a product of Union/Yankee imagination. But for a few, including this one, both factions are cooperating in the management of Civil War Inc., the robust and thriving enterprise where a reasonable and compromising explanation for the conflict is out of the question simply because there’s so much advantage (in the form of profit and reputation) in keeping the contending factions going.
Unlike other civil conflicts, the American Civil War holds a global audience. One can search far and wide to find a thousand reenactors of all other civil conflicts in history in the United States, but nearly every nation on the globe has at least one group of dedicated souls who dress up in wool serge to replay Gettysburg. American Civil War books outsell all other American history titles worldwide in every language. Civil war scholars, nearly all Americans, are always welcomed to speak at conferences and seminars on 19th century topics.
But the battle that they fight, unlike the battle that their subjects fought, will never end. And, in the interest of scholarship and sanity, it needs to.