Taking place only a year apart, the battles off Java between 27 February and 1 March, 1942, and the air attacks on a Japanese task force in the Bismarck Sea between 2 and 4 March, 1943, could not have been more different in outcome or in net result. Together, they also serve to show how Japan intended their Pacific War to be conducted: more like a kendo match than a struggle for survival.
The battles around Java took place only weeks after Japan started her Pacific/Dutch East Indies offensive in December 1941. On 27 February, a Japanese escort of two heavy cruisers, two light cruisers and fourteen destroyers under Rear-Admiral Takeo Takagi, met a scratch force of two heavy cruisers, three light cruisers and nine destroyers under Dutch Rear Admiral Karel Doorman, commanding the naval contingent of the ABDA (American-British-Dutch-Australian) Command that was trying to attack a Japanese amphibious tack force approaching Java in the Java Sea.
The outcome was never really in doubt. The Allied ships had never fought or maneuvered together; the largest group of them with any coherence was the four ships of the US Navy’s Destroyer Division 58. The Japanese had trained together for a year, and had already fought two successful actions as a unit. In a running battle over some seven hours on 27 February half the Allied fleet was sunk and Doorman killed to no Japanese losses. Next day two of the Allied survivors were sunk at the Sunda Straights by another surface escort, this time two small Japanese ships were lost. At the Java Sea again on 28 February, three more survivors of the earlier battle were lost. Ten ships and over two thousand men were lost to total Japanese personnel loss of probably less than a hundred. The Dutch Asiatic fleet and the US Navy’s Asiatic Squadron were irreparably damaged. The Netherlands never regained its prewar presence in Indonesia.
A year later the tables had turned. After abandoning Guadalcanal and losing the Papua peninsula, the Japanese planned to reinforce their lodgement in New Guinea by sending a reinforcing brigade to Lae on eight troop transports and eight destroyers out of Rabaul. The Australian/American Allies intercepted their messages and determined to stop them.
The Japanese convoy’s route was out of American aircraft carrier range, but well within range of medium bombers. Commanded by Rear Admiral Masatomi Kimura, the convoy was to leave Simpson Harbor on 28 February skirt the northern coast of New Britain and round the island on the eastern end, running in to Lae by 4 March before the Americans knew they were there. Even so, the Imperial High Command only believed the odds of success were about 50-50.
The Allies knew where the Japanese were most of the time due to their network of aerial observation, radio intercepts, coast watchers and submarine patrols. By 4 March only 1,200 of the 6,700 soldiers that left Rabaul had arrived at Lae, and the rest were either killed in the five destroyers and eight transports sunk by American and Australian aircraft, or had gone back to Rabaul in the one destroyer that turned back. The Allies lost less than twenty men. In two days of free-for-all attacks on the convoy. Australian Beaufighters had strafed with 20 mm cannon, PBYs had dropped bombs, and medium bombers had strafed and skip-bombed their way into the history books as the second sea fight fought primarily by land-based land force aircraft (the first was when the Japanese sank HMS Repulse and Prince of Wales 8 December 1941). The Japanese, as a result, elected not to reinforce New Guinea through Lae again.
Looking at these two actions, one is struck not only by the reversal of Japan’s fortunes in the Pacific War, but by the reasons for it. Neither action depended on or were affected by the fast Japanese carrier forces–the Kido Butai— that had been devastated at Coral Sea and Midway. So, was the Bismarck Sea fight affected by the loss of the Japanese carriers just three months after their decisive win around Java? On the outside, no. But Japan’s attitudes towards the war were. At Midway, the Japanese task force turned around and went home after the fourth carrier was sunk. Why? They had nothing to do with the landings, and by some analyses the landing itself was bait for the American carriers.
The answer lies partly in the expectations of the samurai leadership or their Pacific War, and in the sport of wooden swords called kendo. Japan earnestly believed that the Western powers, once they had felt the devastating power of Japan’s navy and army, would shrink from any further violence and seek peace. This, they believed, would take no more than a few months. When the Allies kept fighting, even after the fall of Java and the bombing of Australia, Japan pushed harder, planning “final blows” in the Solomons, Alaska and the very end of the Hawaiian archipelago at Midway. When the Americans had the temerity to attack Japan itself with the Doolittle stunt, these plans became reality.
Then came the Coral Sea, and then Midway. To the samurai mind, their plans failed not because the Americans fought well, but because someone had failed their plans. Their opponent would not recognize the superior skill of Japan’s sword masters and bow to their inevitable defeat. The gods judging this global kendo match were not calling their death blows correctly. Thus, strategically, the samurai leadership of Japan became confused and went into a defensive stance until their opponents grew weary.
What Were They Thinking: A Fresh Look At Japan At War, 1941-45 examines the Japanese war in the Pacific, and how the swaggering swordsmen of Japan decided to take on the whole world. Available in hardbound, paper and PDF.